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ABSTRACT

Psychedelics have been used medicinally and as vehicles for spiritual discovery
for millennia. They achieved international notoriety in the decades following Albert
Hofmann’s accidental discovery of LSD’s psychological effects, which spurred an
explosion of psychedelic research. While much of the research showed psychedelics to
have tremendous therapeutic potential, some studies declared them to be dangerous. By
the end of the 1960s, LSD and other classic psychedelics had become cultural pariahs,
linked to the counterculture, chromosome damage, and birth defects. For this reason,
Congress outlawed psychedelics in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Control and
Prevention Act of 1970, which consolidated more than a half-century of racist and
xenophobic drug legislation into one law. This essentially strangled psychedelic research
with bureaucratic control and rendered reclassification all but impossible, despite
promising modern research. For these reasons, this capstone will consider psychedelic
drugs in the context of United States illicit drug policy as a whole and effectively argue
that racism, classism, and xenophobia brought about psychedelic prohibition to the
detriment of those seeking nontraditional medicine to help assuage the symptoms of a
variety of mental illnesses.
Key Words: Psychedelics, Drug Policy, Racism, Xenophobia, Medicine, Human Rights
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Dedicated to those who have shown fearless devotion to the treatment of mental illness
and protection of human rights by studying a class of drugs that has remained a societal
pariah for decades.
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INTRODUCTION

Psychedelic drug use did not originate with the counterculture of the 1960s.
Albert Hofmann’s accidental ingestion of LSD-25 in 1943 was not the first moment in
history wherein an individual experienced “a dreamlike state” characterized by “an
uninterrupted stream of fantastic pictures, extraordinary shapes with intense,
kaleidoscopic play of colors”1 as a result of drug administration. The Ancient Aztecs
referred to psilocybin mushrooms as teonanacatl, or “flesh of the gods.”2 The fly agaric
mushroom was utilized by the Aryans prior to their conquest of India around 1600 BCE;
over one hundred hymns in the Rig-Veda, the earliest lengthy piece of Hindu literature
are devoted to deifying this fungus.3 Many have speculated that the mandrake root, which
was used by oracles, magicians, and necromancers, played a role in creating the illusion
that Jesus Christ had risen from the dead.4 Compiling a history of psychedelic drug use
would involve reviewing thousands of years of human experience from around the entire
globe.
Unfortunately, United States drug policy does not consider this long and complex
history. Psychedelic drugs fell victim to the trajectory of US drug control that began in

1

Albert Hofmann, LSD: My Problem Child (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1980), 9. https://www.maps.org/images/pdf/books/lsdmyproblemchild.pdf
2
Lester Grinspoon and James B. Bakalar, Psychedelic Drugs Reconsidered (New York:
The Lindesmith Center, 1997), 17.
3
Ibid., 39-40.
4
Ibid., 39.
1

the second half of the 19th century. Prohibition of these substances overlooked the fact
that they are often considered a group distinct from other, addictive drugs such as heroin
and cocaine.5 This broad class of drugs has been experimentally administered to
successfully treat anxiety, PTSD, depression, addiction, and OCD.6 However, their use is
wholly proscribed under the federal Controlled Substances Act of 1970, which
categorizes illicit drugs into five groups, or schedules, based on the relative risk factors
for each drug. For example, psychedelics were placed in Schedule I, the most prohibited
category of drugs in the United States. Schedule I drugs supposedly exhibit “a high
potential for abuse, no current medical use, and a lack of safety for use under medical
supervision.”7 Under their current legal status, psychedelics are incredibly difficult to
research. Though they could be used to treat a variety of mental health disorders that
therapists have found difficult, the future of psychedelics in medicine looks gloomy for
the present.
This thesis will therefore seek to unravel the complicated history of illicit drug
legislation in the United States in order to comprehensively examine the legal status of
psychedelic drugs. This section will introduce each chapter and present an argument to
consider throughout the project. Chapter 1 will illustrate the history of drug prohibition in
the United States from the passage of the Harrison Narcotics Act in 1914 through the
1950s, focusing in particular on the societal and political forces that have consistently
brought about changes in drug legislation. Chapter 2 will discuss how the trends outlined

Mason Marks, “Psychedelic Medicine for Mental Illness and Substance Use Disorders:
Overcoming Social and Legal Obstacles,” New York University Journal of Legislation
and Public Policy 21, 2018, 90.
6
Ibid., 71.
7
Bakalar and Grinspoon, 310.
2
5

in Chapter 1 persisted through the discovery of lysergic acid diethylamide and subsequent
explosion of psychedelic research, bringing about the federal Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (Title II of which is known as the
aforementioned Controlled Substances Act). Chapter 3 will shift to a comparison of
psychedelic research conducted prior to 1970 and contemporary psychedelic studies,
finding that the totality of evidence surrounding psychedelics contradicts their legal
classification. Chapter 4 will examine how relevant Supreme Court precedents have
affected both individual liberty and avenues for medical legalization.
The legal classification of psychedelics ignores a surfeit of research
demonstrating their undeniable therapeutic and medical potential. Pahnke indicated
psilocybin could elicit “a substantial amount of positive, and virtually no negative,
persisting changes in attitude and behavior” in the preeminent psychedelic experiment of
the 1960s, the “Good Friday Experiment.”8 Doblin’s follow-up study more than two
decades later found these positive effects to have persisted for many of Pahnke’s
subjects.9 Albert Hofmann describes how LSD-assisted psychotherapy in the 1950s and
‘60s demonstrated great promise by eliminating barriers between patient and therapist,
bringing out suppressed memories, and alleviating the isolation of patients with
“egocentric problem cycle[s].”10 Langner, a psychiatrist with experience in more than
two thousand LSD-assisted psychotherapy sessions, declared in 1967 that he could not

Rick Doblin, “Pahnke’s Good Friday Experiment: A Long-Term Follow-up and
Methodological Critique,” The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology 23, no. 1, 1991: 23.
9
Ibid.
10
Hofmann, 27.
3
8

“believe that [LSD] under proper supervision can be other than a useful chemotherapeutic
agent in psychiatry.”11
Modern research supports this high praise. Griffiths’ study on psilocybin and
mystical experiences showed that after fourteen months, a high number of subjects
treated with the drug reported substantial levels of improvement in well-being, life
satisfaction, and positive behavior.12 Additionally, nearly all of these subjects rated the
study as one of the most spiritually significant experiences of their lives.13 Gasser’s
follow-up study on Swiss patients who underwent psycholytic therapy14 with either
MDMA or LSD between 1988 and 1993 showed that 90% of the patients reported at least
some degree of improvement with the psychological issues they were experiencing.15
Bogenschutz’s trial with psilocybin-assisted psychotherapy for patients suffering from
Alcohol Use Disorder found that “each [patient] achieved a reduction in alcohol intake
reflective of his/her goals.”16 Similarly, Johnson has found that psilocybin may be an
effective treatment for smoking cessation in a study wherein 60% of the patients had quit

Fred W. Langner, “Six Years’ Experience with LSD Therapy,” in The Use of LSD in
Psychotherapy and Alcoholism, ed. Harold A. Abramson (New York: Bobbs-Merrill,
1967): 128.
12
Roland R. Griffiths, et al., “Psilocybin Occasioned Mystical-Type Experiences:
Immediate and Persisting Dose-Related Effects,” Psychopharmacology 218, no. 4 (2011):
662. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3308357/
13
Ibid.
14
A form of psychotherapy where psychedelics are administered.
15
Peter Gasser, “Psycholytic Therapy with MDMA and LSD in Switzerland,” Newsletter
of the Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies 5, no. 3 (1994-95): 6.
https://maps.org/news-letters/v05n3/05303psy.html
16
Michael P. Bogenschutz, et al., “Clinical Interpretations of Patient Experience in a
Trial of Psilocybin-Assisted Psychotherapy for Alcohol Use Disorder,” Pharmacology 9
(2018): 5. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5826237/
4
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smoking more than a year after treatment.17 At the very least, the literature shows that a
number of psychedelics have the potential to improve the psyche of numerous individuals
suffering from a wide variety of ailments when administered by an experienced physician
in a controlled environment.
Psychedelics are also involved in some religious rituals, and consideration of
these practices by the courts has had a major impact on First Amendment jurisprudence.
This development has severely limited Free Exercise protections for minority religions,
most significantly in the case of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
v. Smith. The Court departed from a forty year-old balancing test that instructed judges to
weigh the burden a law placed on an individual’s religious exercise against the interest of
the state in prohibiting certain acts.18 It instead eliminated all Free Exercise protections in
cases where the defendant’s religious practices violate criminal law.19 This authoritarian
precedent is “an ominous sign that minority religions… are now vulnerable to the whim
and caprice of majoritarian sentiments.”20 As such, it serves as the psychedelic analogue
to the myriad other ills resulting from stiff drug control policies, such as the mass
incarceration of predominantly non-white, poor Americans.21
In fact, drugs in the United States remained almost entirely unregulated by the
federal government until legislators responded to trumped-up charges of criminality
Matthew W. Johnson, et al., “Long-term Follow-up of Psilocybin-facilitated Smoking
Cessation,” American Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse 43, no. 1 (2017): 57.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5641975/
18
Rashelle Perry, “Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith: A
Hallucinogenic Treatment of the Free Exercise Clause,” Journal of Contemporary Law
17, no. 2 (1991): 362, 365.
19
Ibid., 365.
20
Ibid., 359.
21
Michael Javen Fortner, Black Silent Majority: The Rockefeller Drug Laws and the
Politics of Punishment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), 259.
5
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linked to drug use among the nation’s African American and Chinese-American
residents. When the media-generated hysteria surrounding minorities and drug use
reached its fever pitch in the first two decades of the 20th century, the federal government
took action by regulating cocaine and heroin, which were linked, respectively, to African
American and Chinese-American violence. All subsequent drug control legislation
targeted some kind of seemingly dissident group, as summarized by Richard Harvey
Brown: “drug prohibition as a vehicle for minority repression appears…in the United
States” in the early 20th century.22 This sort of repression is evident in the subsequent
outlawing of marijuana to target Mexican-American immigrants in the 1930s, and
psychedelic prohibition to target the leaders of the counterculture in the 1960s.
A departure from rights protection that unquestioningly privileges authoritarian
state laws is, at minimum, an alarming consequence of outlawing psychedelics. These
drugs could also provide relief to millions who suffer from mental illness. Charlotte
Walsh makes a more radical argument that interprets psychedelic prohibition as a
violation of cognitive liberty, which she explains is simply “the right to autonomous selfdetermination over [individuals’] own brain chemistry.”23 Such an analysis is invaluable
and offers a holistic evaluation of human rights through the lens of psychedelic use.
This thesis argues that psychedelics have been mishandled by the law, to the
detriment of millions. They are a casualty of a broader race and class war whereby

Richard Harvey Brown, “The Opium Trade and Opium Policies in India, China,
Britain, and the United States: Historical Comparisons and Theoretical Interpretations,”
Asian Journal of Social Science 30, no. 3 (2002): 651.
23
Charlotte Walsh, “Psychedelics and Cognitive Liberty: Reimagining Drug Policy
through the Prism of Human Rights,” International Journal of Drug Policy 29 (2016):
83.https://lra.le.ac.uk/bitstream/2381/36731/8/Psychedelics%2520and%2520Cognitive%
2520Liberty.pdf
6
22

American power structures have traditionally paired drug use with criminality, resulting
in systemic minority oppression. In light of the evidence pointing to the medical and
therapeutic potential of psychedelic drugs and the dramatic rights-offenses suffered by
both racial and religious minorities, it is apparent that psychedelic prohibition, and drug
prohibition in general, should be reexamined in order to develop more reasonable drug
control legislation.

7

CHAPTER 1
DRUG CONTROL LEGISLATION: THE EARLY YEARS, 1914-1960

In the nineteenth century, drugs now fearfully associated with addiction and
delinquency were commonly used by average citizens.24 Morphine and other opiates were
hailed as incomparably effective painkillers and sedatives and were widely administered
by physicians.25 Cocaine was a common ingredient in sodas, medicines, and a variety of
other readily available consumables, while its use was promoted by such esteemed
individuals as Sigmund Freud.26 In the psychedelic sphere, mescaline was isolated from
peyote buttons in 1896, and though it wasn’t as popular as cocaine or opium, the drug
was praised as inducing “an orgy of vision.”27 Despite widespread use and acceptance of
potentially dangerous drugs, the Harrison Narcotic Act passed in 1914 and became the
first domestic federal drug control law.

Lisa N. Sacco, “Drug Enforcement in the United States: History, Policy, and Trends,”
Congressional Research Service, 2014, 2. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43749.pdf
25
David F. Musto, The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999), 1-2.
26
Ibid., 7.
27
Havelock Ellis, “Mescal: A New Artificial Paradise,” Contemporary Review, 1898,
quoted in Stephen Siff, Acid Hype: American News Media and the Psychedelic
Experience (Urbana, Chicago, and Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 2015), 18.
8
24

Drugs were ostensibly linked to race many decades prior to the passage of the
Harrison Act. David F. Musto notes that opium addiction, particularly the real or
imagined relationship between Chinese and opium addiction, had been viewed
unfavorably by the public long before opium
use was regulated.28 Perhaps the first
intersection of racism and drug use can be seen
in the public’s reaction to opium, as opponents
of Chinese immigration often pointed to
exaggerated numbers of opium addicts among
the Chinese population in support of more
exclusive immigration policies; they excited
public fear of opium by linking its use to
interracial sex.29 In Victorian America, sexual
relations outside of marriage were abhorred,
and the idea of white women having extramarital sex with working-class Chinese men

Figure 1. Poster depicting a young white man
presumably attempting to "rescue" the numerous
young white women helplessly addicted to opium.
Joseph Jarrow, “The Queen of Chinatown,” Library
of Congress.
https://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2014636527/

was nothing short of terrifying.30 Hamilton Wright, the most dedicated supporter of
federal restrictions on opium use, “asserted the dangers of opiates in the United States
with racial slurs that associated drug use with minorities” in order to garner congressional

28

Musto, 4.
Erich Goode, Drugs in American Society (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 94-95.
30
Diana L. Ahmad, “Opium Smoking, Anti-Chinese Attitudes, and the American
Medical Community, 1850-1890,” American Nineteenth Century History 1, no. 2 (2000),
59.
9
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support for drug legislation.31 He and other supporters “propagandized… against the
menaces of opium, addicts, orientals, and aboriginals”32 with statements such as the
following: “One of the unfortunate phases of the habit of opium smoking in this country
is the large number of women who have become involved and were living as commonlaw wives of or cohabitating with Chinese.”33 These views crystallized with California’s
passage of a statute penalizing the patrons of opium dens in 1881 and in the federal
Chinese Exclusion Act, which effectively eliminated Chinese immigration for ten years,
in 1882.34
Cocaine was similarly linked to African American criminality. A 1913 New York
Times article reported that “two negro boys who were crazed by cocaine” instigated a
massive race riot in Mississippi after killing eight people and wounding several others.35
The two supposed “fiends” in Mississippi were lynched36 in just one instance where the
fear of black cocaine users led to lynching. The following year, another Times article
constructed an image of the black cocaine user that must have been incredibly alarming
for white readers. According to the author, a lower-class black man would become taken
by “the wildest form of insane exaltation” upon sniffing cocaine, after which he would
experience depression which, along with accompanying hallucinations, “often incites

31

Brown, 643.
Ibid., 642.
33
Hamilton Wright, Report of the International Opium Commission, Shanghai, China,
February 1, 1909 to February 26, 1909 (Shanghai: North-China Daily News & Herald,
1909), 45.
34
Goode, 95.
35
“10 Dead, 20 Hurt in a Race Riot: Drug-Crazed Negroes Start a Reign of Terror and
Defy Whole Mississippi Town,” New York Times, Sep. 29, 1913.
36
“Drug-Crazed Negroes,” NYT.
10
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homicidal attacks upon innocent and unsuspecting victims.”37 As if an insane, cocainefueled “negro drug ‘fiend’” who sought to terrorize innocents wasn’t frightening enough,
the author added that cocaine renders its users impervious to bullets in addition to
improving their marksmanship.38
Such claims are supported by fantastical stories, in which one black man
reportedly absorbed a bullet through the heart and another to the chest before finally
forcing the officer to beat him into submission. Another involves a “cocaine nigger” in
North Carolina who purportedly murdered five men using only five bullets.39 Musto
remarks that “anticipation of black rebellion inspired white alarm,” and that fear of the
“cocainized black” grew simultaneously with the number of lynchings and the extent of
legal segregation.40 The official position of the United States government regarding drug
use is best characterized by Hamilton Wright’s commentary on African American
cocaine use: “It has been authoritatively stated that cocaine is often the direct incentive to
the crime of rape by negroes of the South and other sections of the country.”41
Fear of racial rebellion and geopolitics in Asia would seem to be strange issues
driving Congress to restrict drug use. However, the United States’ colonization of the
Philippines in 1898 essentially dropped the problem of opium use on Capitol Hill.42 For
reasons that Musto claims were largely morality-driven, Congress rejected a bill that
would have restored the Spanish system of governmental monopoly over opium, whereby
Edward Huntington Williams, “Negro Cocaine ‘Fiends’ are a New Southern Menace:
Murder and Insanity Increasing Among Lower Class Blacks Because They Have Taken
to ‘Sniffing’ Since Deprived of Whisky by Prohibition,” New York Times, Feb. 8, 1914.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
40
Musto, 7.
41
Wright, Report, 582.
42
Ibid., 25.
11
37

the government would profit through its sale.43 Instead, Congress prohibited opium use
for Filipinos in 1905 while allowing other citizens to continue to use the drug for three
more years in the Philippines.44 This reservation was specifically included for Chinese
residents of the Philippines,45 out of respect for the perceptions of Chinese opium use
detailed above. Britain followed suit in 1906 by agreeing to phase out their centuries-old
practice of exporting opium from India to China by 1916.46 Driven by a combination of
anti-imperialism47 and a desire for industrial growth, the Chinese government launched a
fierce campaign against opium use in the first decade of the twentieth century.48
US officials saw this international mobilization against opium use as an
opportunity to get a potentially lucrative foot in the door of Chinese trade.49 By
convening the International Opium Commission (casually referred to as the Shanghai
Conference), the United States hoped to appease Chinese merchants, who had responded
to the maltreatment of Chinese immigrants by boycotting US goods in 1905.50 In order to
save the US from the embarrassment of having passed no domestic narcotics legislation,
Congress banned the importation of nonmedical opium just prior to the convening of the

43

Ibid., 26-27.
Ibid., 28.
45
Ibid., 28.
46
Ibid., 29.
47
Much of this can be seen as an expression of frustration with the British opium trade,
which many Chinese accurately saw as a method by which the British maintained power
over China. By flooding the nation with opium in exchange for silver, tea and silk, the
British profited from the large number of Chinese addicts while perpetuating the problem
of addiction and draining valuable resources from the country. See Brown, “The Opium
Trade,” 631.
48
Musto, 30.
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid.
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1909 Shanghai Opium Conference.51 At the Conference, supporters of stronger narcotics
control in the United States added a powerful new weapon to their arsenal, as each
attending nation agreed to take “drastic measures… to control morphine and other opium
derivatives;” the US could not in good faith petition for stiff restrictions on narcotics to
be implemented in other nations without taking similar measures itself.52
Following the Shanghai Conference, Congress rejected the Foster bill, which
would have introduced criminal penalties for those who failed to comply with proposed
new tax and record-keeping restrictions on narcotics.53 In 1911, the US participated in the
International Opium Conference at the Hague, where concerns over the hypocrisy of
pushing for drug laws in the international community without having any of its own again
pressured the United States to pass prohibitive legislation.54 In 1914, with Democrats
controlling both Houses and the Presidency,55 Congress overcame issues involving the
Constitution’s state-federal balance of power and passed the Harrison Narcotics Act.56
This Act, which Erich Goode characterizes as “the single most important piece of drug
legislation ever enacted in the United States,”57 was essentially the Foster bill recast as a
tax measure for constitutional purposes.58 The Harrison Act only regulated cocaine and
opiates,59 both of which were directly tied to perceptions of minority races. For the time

51

Brown, 643.
Musto, 37.
53
Ibid., 41-42.
54
Goode, 97.
55
Musto, 59.
56
Brown, 643.
57
Goode, 97.
58
Brown, 643.
59
O. Hayden Griffin, III, “A Democracy Deficit Within American Drug Policy,”
Southern California Review of Law and Social Justice 26 (2017): 116. https://heinonline13
52

being, psychedelics and other now-illicit drugs such as marijuana remained off the
federal government’s radar.
In 1919, the Supreme Court prohibited addiction maintenance, and alcohol
consumption was outlawed in 1920 with the
18th Amendment.60 As intoxicants increasingly
became federally regulated, cannabis entered
public discourse as a dangerous drug being
delivered across the southern border by deviant
Chicano immigrants. The New York Times in
1925 reported that the plant incited violent
behavior: “Crazed from smoking marihuana,
Escrado Valle… ran amuck today in a local
hospital with a butcher knife and killed six
persons before he could be subdued.”61 Two
years later, the newspaper claimed that a family
had been “driven insane by eating the

Figure 2. Poster linking marijuana to sexual promiscuity
among white women. 1936
“Marihuana: Weed with Roots in Hell,” from
https://druglibrary.net/schaffer/hemp/history/rootsinhell.htm

Marihuana plant” and that doctors had indicated the four children would not survive
while the mother would remain insane forever.62 In 1930, Harry Anslinger was appointed
as the Commissioner of Narcotics in the newly-created Federal Bureau of Narcotics.63

org.libsrv.wku.edu/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/scws26&div=9&id=&page=&t=155
6599403&collection=journals&t=1556599404
60
David F. Musto, “The 1937 Marijuana Tax Act,” Archives of General Psychiatry 26
(1972): 423.
61
“Kills Six in a Hospital,” New York Times, Feb. 21, 1925.
62
“Mexican Family Go Insane,” New York Times, Jul. 6, 1927.
63
Musto, American Disease, 210.
14

Anslinger assumed this position at a time of increasing alarm over marijuana that “was
directed at the Mexicans who…’got loaded on the stuff and caused a lot of trouble,
stabbing, assaults, and so on.’”64
Curiously, Harry Anslinger deferred decisions on marijuana control to the states
until 1935.65 He didn’t begin to push for a federal marijuana bill until political pressure
from southwestern states became too great to ignore.66 In other words, because the states
who faced the greatest competition from Mexican immigrant laborers desired marijuana
control, federal prohibition of marijuana became a major goal for the FBN. Once
Anslinger decided to pursue federal legislation, he used everything available to him to
ensure the bill’s passage, including falsified news reports and pseudoscience. In this way,
the racism and xenophobia of one geographic area’s officials became national law. David
F. Musto summarizes the United States’ reaction to marijuana as patently racist in his
seminal work on the subject: “The attack on marihuana occurred in the 1930s when
Chicanos became a distinct and visible unemployed minority.”67
A key weapon in Anslinger’s arsenal was a letter the FBN received from the
Alamosa Daily Courier, which Anslinger frequently cited as evidence of the danger of
marijuana use. The letter explained that marijuana caused criminality among Colorado’s
“degenerate Spanish-speaking residents… most of whom are low mentally, because of
social and racial conditions.”68 In 1937, Anslinger authored an article in American
magazine that included a litany of horror stories involving marijuana “addicts,” which

64

Ibid., 222.
Ibid., 223.
66
Ibid.
67
Ibid., 245.
68
Ibid., 223.
65

15

“were also embroidered with racial stereotypes, sexual innuendos, and prurient details
absent from the original reports.”69 For a nation in the throes of the Great Depression,
Mexican immigrants were seen as unwanted labor competition70 and presented an easy
target for Anslinger’s anti-drug rhetoric. Anslinger presented his horror stories to
Congress in 1937, as did several medical experts, one of whom testified the drug did
indeed cause insanity for many users.71 Congress was convinced, and the Marijuana Tax
Act passed later that year.72 Thus, the federal government criminalized yet another
minority through drug prohibition.
Though it is possible that early drug prohibition came about from a desire to
protect the health and safety of the American populace, the fact that the first two major
pieces of prohibitive drug legislation specifically targeted three different minorities
indicates that the original aim of US policymakers in prohibiting certain substances was
more likely intended to preserve the racial hierarchy of the time. In concluding his work
on the opium trade, Richard Harvey Brown offers a damning summary of the
mechanisms used for minority repression in the American legal system:
…drug regulation as a vehicle for minority repression appears only in the United
States… the mobilization of state power by one group against another could not
easily be explicitly targeted at, say, the Chinese. Instead, minority repression
could be achieved indirectly through laws against a particular practice favored by
a certain group, rather than directly by an explicit targeting of that group. Thus,
anti-immigration laws were passed against Chinese foreigners, whereas laws
against opium smoking (but not drinking) were against Chinese citizens and legal
residents of the United States.73
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In the decades following the passage of the Marijuana Tax Act, the criminal
nature of the supposed tax measures governing drug control became more apparent. Drug
use waned during World War II, only to return dramatically in the years following.
Responding to the spike in heroin addiction immediately following World War II,
Congress passed the federal Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, which introduced
mandatory minimum sentences for drug possession.74 In 1954, Harry Anslinger testified
before the Senate that “Asian Communists” were intentionally spreading drug addiction
among American troops in Korea and Japan.75 Drug addiction once again came into the
national spotlight as the Daniel Bill drug control hearings were televised in 1956.76
Likewise, a number of addiction-related films were produced during this decade, such as
One-Way Ticket to Hell,77 and A Hatful of Rain.78 In 1956, Congress increased the
mandatory sentences for some offenses to five years and introduced the death penalty as a
punishment for those selling heroin to minors.79 Once again, drug abuse and minority
communities were closely linked.
During World War II and in the years following, African Americans made
significant economic progress, though in heavily segregated communities.80 At the same
time, the news media created a “Negro crime wave” that embarrassed African Americans
who were increasingly gaining better economic footing and desired to exonerate the race
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from claims of inferiority.81 Black areas still dealt with disproportionate rates of poverty,
and many poor African Americans without legitimate sources of income became
involved in the surging heroin market of the 1950s.82 In keeping with the media’s
traditional sensationalizing of drug use, “black periodicals frequently published dramatic
articles about big drug busts, sensational profiles of ‘good’ people gone ‘wrong,’ or
sorrowful accounts of ‘one youthful victim’ who ‘paid with his life for his folly.’”83
Working- and middle- class blacks came to see drug users as “urban blight… something
disturbing but ignorable.”84
But because African Americans “could not enjoy the fruits of postwar American
citizenship out on the suburban frontier,” working- and middle-class blacks dealt with
poverty directly and eventually came to see poor people as criminally destructive to their
communities.85 Drug addiction was linked to criminality and seen as a moral rather than
psychological issue; drug users were making deliberate choices to become criminals86—
in the eyes of the black majority, they ceased to exist as complex humans deeply affected
by segregation and poverty and instead were looked at as cancerous. It is for this reason
that Harlem’s leaders supported stiff penalties for drug dealers and users in the latter half
of the 1960s:87 they wished to remove poor addicts and dealers that had made their
communities unlivable.
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CHAPTER 2
LSD: THERAPEUTIC MIRACLE OR SOCIETAL MENACE?

During the 1950s and 60s, while political leaders were formulating policies to
deal with growing numbers of drug addicts, exciting new drugs were being tested in a
slew of experiments conducted with varying levels of medical responsibility. The
discovery of LSD’s psychological effects came about with Albert Hofmann’s accidental
ingestion of the substance in 1943.88 By the mid-1950s, LSD was being tested by
physicians across the United States.89 In 1954, Aldous Huxley associated LSD and other
psychedelics with mysticism in The Doors of Perception,90 and psychedelics thereafter
came to be seen both as potentially useful therapeutic chemicals and as means for
personal exploration. Steven J. Novak claims that LSD became a “cultural crusade” at
this point, and that therapists soon after “abandoned caution and adopted it in their
clinical practice.”91
One such therapist was Timothy Leary, an accomplished psychologist whose
work on personality change transformed into a religious movement of sorts after he tried
psilocybin for the first time in 1960.92 Most of Leary’s experiments thereafter were
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focused on psychedelic use, but were devoid of nearly all safety considerations and true
research controls: “He foresaw collaboration between experimenter and subject, each
with full control of experiments that would take place not in laboratories, but the
world.”93 Some of Leary’s test subjects experienced negative reactions to psychedelics,
including one woman who attempted to commit suicide the day after a mescaline trip
with Leary.94 In 1963, Harvard terminated Leary for conducting experiments on
students,95 and LSD was thrust into public consciousness with reports of a drug bust in
Leary’s home in 1966.96 That year, Brian Rosborough equated the media’s handling of
LSD with the hysteria over marijuana three decades before: “public commentary on
psychedelic drugs has been exaggerated in a manner paralleling the evolution of social
and legal attitudes toward marijuana. Magazines rushed to the fore with irresponsible and
misleading studies.”97
This furor essentially drowned the voices of responsible researchers who
recognized LSD’s potential in mental health treatment. Albert Hofmann described his
discovery of LSD as purely joyous: “LSD brought me the same happiness and
gratification that any pharmaceutical chemist would feel on learning that a substance he
or she produced might possibly develop into a valuable medicament.”98 For Hofmann
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however, the drug’s explosion as a popular inebriant made LSD a “problem child”
instead of a valuable medical tool.99
In 1965, responding to “a relatively uninformed public” demanding LSD control,
Congress passed the Drug Abuse Control Amendments, which outlawed the sale of
psychedelics.100 This was followed by Sandoz Pharmaceuticals’ refusal to continue to
supply LSD to the United States, effectively halting all legitimate LSD experimentation
in the US.101 In contrast, recreational LSD use continued to grow in popularity and
notoriety, and in 1967 a report supposedly linking LSD to chromosome damage was
released and cited by widely circulating news sources as proof of the drug’s ill effects.102
Just as users of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana had been considered violent, stories of
murderous LSD users were frequently printed. One article told of a man who couldn’t
remember stabbing his mother to death because he had been “flying on LSD for three
days” and included an anecdote about a toddler who was thrown into a convulsive fit
after accidentally swallowing an LSD-laced sugar cube.103 It also reported that the New
York County Medical Society called LSD “the most dangerous and abused drug in the
country and one that often caused uncontrollable impulses toward violence.”104 Another
report claimed a college freshman had jumped out of a window and fallen to her death
while on LSD, and tellingly implicated hippies by pointing out that her apartment was
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located “in the heart of the hippie district, but [that] she wasn’t a hippie.”105 LSD, “a
substance with… fantastic effects on mental perception and on the experience of the
outer and inner world,”106 came to be seen as one of the most dangerous drugs around.107
What set the 1960s apart from the narcotics scares of decades past was the sheer
number of drug users. Arrests for marijuana possession increased tenfold between 1965
and 1970, and estimates of the number of American heroin users indicate the same level
of growth from 1960 to 1970.108 The staggeringly rapid growth of drug use in the US
provides a possible explanation for the extremity of the legal response to it. However, the
method of prohibition remained unchanged—the loudest proponents of narcotic
legislation still sought to control certain seemingly subversive minorities. “Hippies”
protesting the Vietnam War and various flavors of injustice constituted a specific and
frightening minority group, while poor African Americans were targeted as the main
source of criminality and degradation in black communities. In 1970, Congress
responded to the public hysteria over drug use with the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and
Control Act, which mainly just consolidated all previous federal drug legislation. 109 One
portion of the Act did alter drug policy in a radical and lasting manner, however. The
section referred to as the Controlled Substances Act created five schedules for drugs that
ranked them based on their supposed danger and medical potential.
This act was somewhat benign on its face. In fact, it’s even been described as a
“transition between reliance on law enforcement with severe penalties and a therapeutic
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approach.”110 Individual states, on the other hand, strengthened law enforcement
substantially in order to combat drug use. In 1973 Nelson Rockefeller, then-governor of
New York, signed a bill that mandated life sentences for illicit drug distribution, life
sentences for those who committed violent crimes while under the influence of a narcotic,
and eliminated protections for young drug dealers.111 This law was the first to establish
minimum sentences for drug offenses, and forty-eight states followed suit over the next
ten years.112 Michael J. Fortner shows that the “black silent majority” was the driving
force behind the passage of Rockefeller’s drug laws.113 He argues that, due to
institutional segregation, working and middle class African Americans lived in
communities where drug-related crime was rampant, and that these black citizens formed
a “silent majority” in the same sense as Nixon’s constituency. While this black silent
majority favored stricter drug control legislation and certainly influenced its passage, the
Rockefeller drug laws were voted on by nearly all-white legislatures at the behest of
those who sought to control poor blacks.
In this sense, classism resulting from institutional racism produced legislated
racism masquerading as “law and order.” After 1973, the number of American prisoners
more than doubled over thirteen years.114 The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 signaled
a major shift to the right in American politics, especially regarding drug law enforcement.
In 1986, President Reagan intensified drug control by signing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act,
which mandated longer sentences for possession of crack-cocaine than for powder
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cocaine, disproportionately and unabashedly targeting drug users of color,115 and the
number of black prisoners increased by 429% over the following five years.116 In 1992
and 1993, 74% of all drug-related prison sentences were imposed on African
Americans.117
The federal drug control legislation the under which the United States still
operates was passed during Richard Nixon’s reactionary presidency that was
characterized by promises of establishing law and order. In the states, white conservative
politicians capitulated to black desires for stiff criminal drug penalties, appeasing African
American voters while simultaneously hopping on the political wave that had elected
Nixon. So what does this mean for psychedelics?
As Musto shows, the practice of scheduling drugs can be dangerous: “the attitude
a drug provoked at the time of its restriction could be frozen into the law.”118 Today
marijuana, LSD, and psilocybin remain Schedule One drugs (defined as having no
medical use and a high potential for abuse) despite myriad research indicating their
medical potential. It is still incredibly difficult for qualified physicians and psychologists
to experiment with psychedelics due to racist and classist laws passed nearly a halfcentury ago. Psychedelic prohibition came at a time of societal upheaval, when
psychedelic users appeared to pose a threat as significant as true drug addicts.
Psychedelics were caught up in a larger, decades-old scheme to control or eliminate
certain populations by criminalizing drug use. This entirely illegitimate system of drug
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control still stands, and the awesome potential of psychedelic medicine has yet to be
thoroughly investigated.
Psychedelic drugs are not seized in such massive quantities as marijuana, cocaine
and heroin, and their users and dealers are arrested and imprisoned far less frequently.
Psychedelics are not addictive and are used in relatively smaller quantities than other
drugs, so law enforcement generally does not prioritize stemming psychedelic drug
trafficking. Additionally, the people connected with psychedelic drug use at the time they
became criminalized were largely white, upper-middle class young adults who were seen
as innocent, though socially deviant. They were not seen as frightening, rape-crazed
African Americans, violent Chicano immigrants, or degenerate Chinese American opium
addicts, and as such, law enforcement has treated them differently.
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CHAPTER 3
PSYCHEDELIC RESEARCH: A CLOSER EXAMINATION

Though the Controlled Substances Act classifies psychedelics similarly to far less
potentially useful drugs, such as cocaine and methamphetamine,119 they have repeatedly
demonstrated incredible potential for use in medical and therapeutic environments. As
mentioned, psychedelics have been used for millennia by a variety of cultures. It is
suspected that peyote use originated in North America more than seven thousand years
ago.120 Jesuit missionaries recorded medicinal use of the drug in the seventeenth
century,121 and many Native Americans continue to use it to treat a variety of ailments
including cancer and diabetes.122 Peter Stafford notes that, remarkably, “these
economically deprived people generally enjoy better-than-average health, and reliable
observers have confirmed that when they do become sick and turn to peyote, the cactus
seems to help them.”123 Ayahuasca is similarly believed to be deeply rooted in the culture
of Native Central and South Americans, and is used today to identify personal problems
such as alcohol dependence so that the user may work to find remedies.124 Its
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contemporary usage in South America is described by Richard Shultes, et al. as “above
all, a medicine—the great medicine.”125
The first recorded white people to medicinally administer psychedelics were D.W.
Prentiss and Francis P. Morgan, who advocated for peyote’s use in treating anxiety,
color-blindness, insomnia, and muscle spasms.126 Medical use of psychedelics was
almost nonexistent during the first half of the twentieth century however, while mescaline
(the major psychoactive substance in peyote) was investigated by some as a model for
psychosis.127 The similarities in the psychological effects of mescaline and LSD led many
scientists to investigate LSD in a similar manner after Hofmann’s discovery of its mental
effects in 1943. In contrast to mescaline however, LSD presented scientists with new and
exciting possibilities for psychopharmacological research, as the drug is several thousand
times more potent than mescaline and “manifests a high specificity, that is, an activity
aimed specifically at the human psyche.”128
This led researchers such as Stanislav Grof to begin to evaluate LSD’s potential
as a healing drug in the mid-1950s.129 In 1957, Betty Eisner and Sidney Cohen
administered LSD to twenty-two patients with minor mental health disorders and
reexamined them after six months; the study showed 73% improvement over several lifestatus criteria (e.g. employment) among its participants.130 That same year, R. A.
Sandison reported that 65% of ninety-three “severely neurotic” patients showed
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substantial improvement six months after being treated with LSD.131 In a 1963 case
study, a teenage girl was cured of her severe, chronic psoriasis in twelve LSD
psychotherapy sessions, after which she claimed to be “calmer and happier than ever
before, and going out with boys for the first time.”132 In the mid-1960s, fifty terminal
patients were treated with LSD, which provided pain relief for over thirty times longer
than morphine, in addition to radically improving the patients’ disposition toward their
impending deaths.133 In the early years of LSD research, many studies seemed to prove
that LSD psychotherapy could cure alcoholism.134
These tests represent only a fraction of the studies conducted on LSD during the
1950s and ‘60s. Unfortunately, as James Bakalar and Lester Grinspoon show,
determining the collective value of the psychedelic literature from that time is quite
difficult due to the high number of variables present in each study and the impossibility
of conducting double-blind experiments.135 In addition, several experiments highlight the
potential for harm in LSD-assisted psychotherapy. As opposed to the sensationalized
reports of birth defects, drug-induced violent crime, and suicide discussed in the previous
section, these studies expose the actual risks of psychedelic use and pose a significant
challenge for future experimentation.
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Sydney Cohen, a former supporter of LSD research, grew increasingly concerned
with the research practices of many and the growing recreational use of the drug, and
published a study in 1960 warning of the potential adverse effects of LSD. He pointed to
the potential for suicide, prolonged psychosis, and hysteria with LSD treatment.136 Other
researchers soon followed suit, and in 1964 Jerome Levine and Arnold M. Ludwig
published an article analyzing both sides of the LSD controversy. They cautioned against
accepting accounts of LSD as a miracle drug in psychotherapy as well as the “misleading
and exaggerated” reports of the dangers of LSD treatment and concluded that “there can
be little doubt that the improper use of LSD may cause great harm.”137 A study published
in 1967 took a similar stance, warning that chronic anxiety, psychosis, flashbacks, panic,
and confusion138 could possibly accompany LSD use.139
Each of these studies cite a dearth of honestly reported information regarding
psychedelic use on both sides of the debate: “comprehensive data are not available since
the literature of the psychedelic movement… has tended to minimize or suppress reports
of adverse reactions.”140 Cohen’s 1960 study was conducted in order to examine why
adverse reactions to LSD treatment seemed so infrequent, and noted that he found no
publications implicating LSD in suicides, possibly because researchers were loath to
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report suicides or other serious complications due to “guilt feelings.”141 Levine and
Ludwig criticized researchers such as Timothy Leary for contributing to the “unabated
enthusiasm” surrounding the use of LSD while ignoring the drug’s potential adverse
effects.142
A review of modern literature on psychedelic use similarly turns up very little
information regarding the drawbacks of psychedelic administration. Most investigators
praise the effects of the drugs, albeit more guardedly than researchers in the 1960s. One
alarming follow-up survey of patients who were administered LSD in Denmark between
1960 and 1973 found that the majority of the patients who responded reported long-term
adverse effects. According to Jens Knud Larsen, 36% of the patients experienced some
form of mental deterioration at the same time as their LSD treatment and the vast
majority suffered long-term side effects.143 Larsen argues that psychiatrists currently
experimenting with psychedelics are playing with fire, as too little is known regarding
their long-term side effects.144 The results of his study certainly indicate that scientists
should exercise extreme caution when administering psychedelics to human subjects.
Even in consideration of such findings, the results of a multitude of modern
projects are promising. In a study similar to Larsen’s long-term follow-up investigation,
Rick Doblin found that patients who participated in Walter Pahnke’s “Good Friday
Experiment” affirmed that the positive behavioral changes they experienced six months
after the experiment persisted roughly twenty-five years after the original experiment; the
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subjects also reported “virtually no negative… changes in attitude and behavior.”145 More
recently, several researchers have continued to examine the effects of drug-induced
mysticism on individual behavior.
Michael P. Bogenschutz and coauthors reported that each participant in a study
involving psilocybin-assisted psychotherapy for patients with Alcohol Use Disorder
exhibited a marked reduction in alcohol use over the following year.146 Matthew W.
Johnson and his associates found psilocybin to be a “feasible adjunct to smoking
cessation treatment” after observing that 60% of their participants had fully abstained
from smoking more than a year after treatment. They also note that current smoking
medications demonstrate a 31% abstinence rate over the year following treatment, though
they qualify their findings by recognizing the small sample size of the study.147
Psychedelics have also been examined for treating more serious mental illnesses.
Michael C. Mithoefer and his research team published a study in 2010 finding that
MDMA-assisted psychotherapy “can be used with acceptable and short-lived side
effects” and “produced clinically and statistically significant improvements in PTSD
symptoms.”148 Roland R. Griffiths and his fellow researchers found psilocybin to
“decrease symptoms of depressed mood and anxiety, and to increase quality of life in
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patients with a life-threatening cancer diagnosis.”149 Francisco A. Moreno and coauthors
published a study in 2006 finding psilocybin-assisted psychotherapy to relieve the
symptoms of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder for longer than twenty-four hours in most
patients.150
A great number of studies investigate the effects of psychedelic use on healthy
volunteers (i.e. people without significant mental illnesses). In another study by Griffiths,
roughly 90% of the healthy subjects examined reported “positive changes in attitudes,
mood, life satisfaction, behavior, and altruism/social effects” persisting fourteen months
after treatment.151 Similar effects on prosocial behavior and empathy were reported by a
group of researchers led by Cedric M. Hysek in a 2014 project on MDMA.152 Erich
Studerus pooled eight psilocybin studies from 1999 to 2008 and affirmed Griffiths’
findings regarding value and attitude changes, adding that their study demonstrates the
“safety and tolerability” of psilocybin experiments on healthy subjects “not only acutely,
but also in the long run.”153
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The difficulty in finding modern studies reporting the negative side effects of
psychedelics can possibly be attributed to modern researchers ethically and cautiously
studying the drugs. The hysteric stories of LSD users plunging to their deaths and of the
drug causing birth defects have disappeared and been replaced by a remarkable amount
of literature on how to safely and effectively administer psychedelics and even how to
safely use them recreationally. In 2011, James Fadiman published The Psychedelic
Explorer’s Guide: Safe, Therapeutic, and Sacred Journeys as a safety manual for
psychedelic use. It includes an eighteen-part checklist for working through a “bad trip”
and a guide on how to prepare set, setting, and dosage for psychedelic trips.154 A quick
survey of erowid.org, a website with a great deal of literature and open forums on
psychedelic drug use yields much information on the hazards of psychedelic use as well
as an active online community providing support and instruction for those curious about
psychedelic use.
While there is no established causal relationship between the increase of
instructional psychedelic literature and decrease of reported adverse effects, modern
studies indicate that recreational psychedelic users have experienced few, if any
significant side effects. Teri Krebs and Pal-Orjan Johansen surveyed 21,979 lifetime
psychedelics users and in 2013 published a study finding “no relation between lifetime
use of psychedelics and any undesirable past year mental health outcomes, including
serious psychological distress, mental health treatment…, or symptoms of panic disorder,
major depressive episode, mania, social phobia, generalized anxiety disorder,
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agoraphobia, post-traumatic stress disorder, or non-affective psychosis.”155 The Drug
Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) is a project that compiled and published statistics on
emergency room visits involving drug use for the years 2004 to 2011, and their estimates
place the total number of visits for the use of MDMA, LSD, ketamine, or other
“miscellaneous hallucinogens” at 210,089.156 Over the same eight-year span, the National
Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) reports 135,724,955 instances of psychedelic
use,157 placing the rate of use-to-ER-visit at .155%. Most people (69%) are treated and
released within 24 hours of their visit. The other 31% were either hospitalized,
transferred to another emergency unit, or left against medical advice.158 So the rate of
use-to-hospital-admittance is .048%. This is a remarkably low figure considering that all
but a few uses of psychedelics each year occur without medical supervision, and speaks
to the relative safety of psychedelic use. It may also indicate that the dissemination of
psychedelic literature has allowed for more educated use of the drugs, thereby reducing
their risk.
For comparison, DAWN shows that prescription antidepressants were responsible
for 146,425 emergency room visits over the same span of time. Prescription
benzodiazepines such as Xanax were implicated in a whopping 853,967 visits and opiates
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were involved in 943,020 emergency room visits.159 While similar statistics from
NSDUH are not available for these semi-legal drugs, the sheer number of emergency
room visits is staggering in comparison to the wholly-proscribed psychedelics. Alcohol,
the least-restricted of these drugs, was involved in the most emergency room visits at
2,542,271.160 At the very least, these numbers show a need to reevaluate drug scheduling
under the Controlled Substances Act.
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Xanax

19,027 22,414 25,259 29,928 39,081 42,304 48,620 50,591

Oxycodone

16,394 17,481 19,557 25,917 40,439 52,635 54,747 46,024

Methadone

13,596 15,833 16,378 18,313 23,498 21,844 27,324 26,015

Hydrocodone

11,538 11,969 13,420 14,469 22,900 22,710 28,837 20,879

Antidepressants

15,569 14,939 23,569 18,335 19,049 20,116 18,384 16,463

MDMA, Ketamine, LSD, and
15,525 16,786 24,955 21,503 27,712 34,023 32,675 36,909
"Miscellaneous Hallucinogens"
Figure 3. Number of emergency department visits for psychedelic users versus other "semilegal" drugs.
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Data Archives, Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN), 2004-2011.
https://www.datafiles.samhsa.gov/study-series/drug-abuse-warning-network-dawn-nid13516

CHAPTER 4
PSYCHEDELICS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT: TWO POTENTIAL AVENUES
OF REDRESS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE LIMITATIONS

In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has ensured that a direct challenge to
the Schedule I status of psychedelics never receives judicial review. While such a legal
strategy could incorporate the bounty of research discussed in the previous section, the
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Court’s decisions leave such information sidelined, judicially speaking. The Supreme
Court has dealt with psychedelics both directly and indirectly. Indirectly, the Court struck
two blows to psychedelic researchers by providing administrative agencies wide judicial
latitude in Weinberger, et al. v. Hynson, Westcott, and Dunning, Inc. (1973) and Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al. (1984). The Court handled
psychedelics directly in Department of Human Resources v. Smith (1990), which
involved the respondent’s sacramental use of peyote. In these cases, the Supreme Court
raised important questions regarding the legitimacy of bureaucratic government and the
liberty of individuals to engage in religious practices largely rejected by mainstream
society. The latter issue raises the equally important question of whether cognitive liberty
is a constitutionally protected right and the degree to which government may regulate that
right.

Difficulties in Rescheduling Controlled Substances Under Chevron and Hynson
The combined efforts of the Court, FDA, and DEA have rendered the process of
rescheduling a drug immensely difficult, if not impossible. Two major Supreme Court
decisions have allowed the FDA and DEA virtually unchecked gatekeeping authority
over drug hearings. These decisions not only allowed administrative agencies to
determine the outcome of a hearing, they gave them the power to determine whether or
not a hearing would take place at all. In 1973, the same year that New York dramatically
raised the state benchmark for drug law enforcement with Rockefeller’s drug laws, the
Supreme Court decided Weinberger, et al. v. Hynson, Westcott and Dunning, Inc. This
decision extended the power of summary judgment to the federal Food and Drug
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Administration over whether the manufacturers or proponents of a drug are entitled to a
hearing on the rights to market that drug.161 According to James O’Reilly, it eliminated
judicial review from the decisions of administrative agencies: “Imagine… a criminal
defendant seeking acquittal being forced to prove at the courthouse door that she did not
commit the crime. If the defendant did not have enough proof, she would not receive a
trial and, instead, simply get the penalty.”162 Such a process is antagonistic to traditional
notions of an adversarial legal system.
Eleven years later, the Court chipped away at another fundamental characteristic
of the American legal system. In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., et al., the Court determined that, in absence of the express direction of
Congress on a certain matter, “a court may not substitute its own construction of a
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency.”163 Thus, the Court delegated what many consider to be its most important
function to bureaucratic agencies by creating an exception to judicial review known as
the “Chevron deference.” This decision, as Charles J. Cooper astutely points out, flies in
the face of one of the United States’ oldest and most fundamental judicial principles: “It
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is.”164 Cooper elaborates that this decision has essentially created an insulated new
branch of government, one which exercises both judicial and legislative powers: the
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Administrative State.165 Aside from the enormous constitutional problem presented by
affording bureaucracy the unchecked powers of two branches of government, this
decision makes it extremely difficult to reschedule a drug.
In enforcing the Controlled Substances Act, the DEA determines whether the
proponents of a drug may receive a hearing for its scheduling or rescheduling, its
administrative law judge determines the outcome of the hearing, and the head of the
administration is not bound by the judge’s ruling.166 After the DEA hearings on MDMA
in 1984, Francis Young, the DEA’s Administrative Law Judge, decided that “’accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States’ is not determined by… dis-approvals by
the FDA. It is determined, rather, by what is actually going on within the health care
community.”167 Finding that “there is a currently accepted medical use for MDMA… that
there is not a lack of accepted safety for its use under medical supervision168… and that
the evidence does establish MDMA to have ‘potential for abuse less than the drugs or
other substances in Schedules I and II,’” Young recommended that the Administrator of
the DEA place MDMA in Schedule III.169 However, the Administrator ignored this
ruling,170 as was his prerogative per Chevron.
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A bureaucratic dictatorship governing drug laws is extremely problematic. First,
concerns over “strangers at the bedside,” as advanced by those opposing what critics term
“socialized medicine,” have become a reality; the whims of unelected officials with no
medical expertise bear more weight than the authority of the medical community.
Second, the judiciary is removed from drug control procedures, as seen in the example
above. Cooper explains that life tenure and guaranteed salary are required for the exercise
of judicial power under Article III of the Constitution. These safeguards were created to
prevent the judicial branch from becoming overly powerful, but they are bypassed by
federal bureaucrats under Chevron.171 Finally, once a drug has been banned, the burden
of proof placed on researchers to show its effectiveness and low potential for harm is
nearly impossible to meet.
Obtaining approval from the DEA and FDA is difficult (only 349 scientists were
licensed to study Schedule I drugs in 2013), and studying illegal drugs often stigmatizes
the scientists involved.172 Additionally, researchers must shoulder the astronomical cost
of conducting research on Schedule I drugs. For example, psilocybin from a synthesis
company in Boston is $12,000 per gram.173 Not only would researchers have to spend
hundreds of thousands of dollars in order to obtain the substances under investigation,
that company would have to jump through an obstacle course of hoops to obtain
permission to supply the drug. The Multidisciplinary Association of Psychedelic
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Substances (MAPS) offers a daunting example of the total cost of studying Schedule I
drugs, as it is currently entrenched in a $26.9 million campaign to make MDMA an FDAapproved prescription medicine.174
In other words, administrative agencies require researchers to investigate illegal
drugs extensively before they will reconsider their merits, hamper the investigation
process with complex, time-consuming, and expensive regulations, and remain the final
arbiter regarding the legal use of certain drugs. Due to the Chevron Deference, any
reasonable interpretation of a statute made by an agency is considered law, “controlling
even over a prior contrary ruling of a federal court… even if you can demonstrate the
agency’s interpretation is wrong… you still lose.”175 Advocates of psychedelic use in
medicine would need to prove that the Schedule I status of a substance is unreasonable,
and considering the real possibilities for harm, though minimal, judges are unlikely to
rule in such a manner. Interestingly, one of the few times courts have ruled agency
decisions unreasonable involved an EPA crackdown on power plant emissions.176
Psychedelics and the Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment states that “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.”177 Historically, the Court has made few exceptions to these rights. In 1963, the
Supreme Court signaled that it would be reluctant to abandon Free Exercise protections
in Sherbert v. Verner. Adell Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church,
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was discharged by her employer for refusing to work on Saturdays and subsequently
denied unemployment benefits by the State of South Carolina for failing “to accept
‘suitable work.’”178 In the majority opinion, Justice Brennan reaffirmed that “the door of
the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental regulation of
religious beliefs,” and established that the government must demonstrate it had utilized
the least invasive means in pursuit of a compelling interest in cases where it sought to
regulate religious acts.179 This application of strict scrutiny in cases involving state
interference with religious practices governed Free Exercise cases for nearly three
decades following Sherbert.
The Court found in favor of Sherbert, holding that denying her unemployment
benefits essentially forced her to choose between her religion and employment, which
unconstitutionally burdened her free exercise rights.180 The Court also held that because
a South Carolina statute specifically protected employees who refused to work on Sunday
for religious reasons, denying Saturday Sabbath observers the same protections would
constitute unconstitutional religious discrimination.181 Allowing Sherbert to receive
unemployment benefits thereby “reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation
of neutrality in the face of religious differences.”182 This religious neutrality mandate
would appear incredibly important for psychedelic religious practices under First
Amendment jurisprudence.
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In 1972, the Court built on Sherbert by finding that even though public
education “ranks at the very apex of the function of a State,” such a compelling interest is
not exempt from the balancing process required by Free Exercise concerns.183 In
Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court found in favor of two Amish boys who challenged their
convictions for refusing to attend school after the eighth grade due to religious
conviction. In order for the government to constitutionally interfere with legitimate
religious practices, “it must appear either that the State does not deny the free exercise of
religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude
to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause.”184 The Court
found neither exception valid in this case.
Interestingly, Chief Justice Burger’s opinion relies almost entirely on the nature of
Amish society and religion. He repeatedly references the fact that the Old Amish Order
had been established for centuries and argues that in order for it to maintain its integrity,
Amish children must not attend secondary school.185 He finds Wisconsin’s assertion of a
duty to protect children from ignorance insufficient to preclude First Amendment
protections largely because members of the Amish community “are productive and very
law-abiding members of society; they reject public welfare in any of its usual modern
forms.”186 In other words, because the Amish hold a distinct and aged set of religious
beliefs and are model citizens by Chief Justice Burger’s standards, their religious
convictions outweigh the state’s interest in public education.
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The Court abandoned strict scrutiny for Free Exercise cases in 1990 with
Employment Division v. Smith. The case involved the denial of unemployment benefits to
Alfred Smith and Galen Black, two members of the Native American Church, because
they had been fired for sacramentally ingesting peyote.187 In the majority opinion, Justice
Antonin Scalia casually dismisses Yoder as a “hybrid” case involving multiple
constitutional rights and relegates the Sherbert test exclusively to cases involving the
Free Exercise Clause and denial of unemployment benefits in the absence of criminal
legislation.188 Instead, because the Oregon law was a generally applicable criminal statute
and did not specifically target the religious beliefs of members of the Native American
Church, Oregon could constitutionally deny unemployment benefits to those who
violated the law, even for religious purposes.189 Though Justice Scalia admits that this
decision burdens religious minorities, he maintains that such is merely an “unavoidable
consequence of democratic government.”190 Here, majoritarian tyranny was declared
preferable to exempting a few individuals from statutes outlawing practices necessary for
the maintenance of their religion.
Justice Harry Blackmun, in dissent, admonished the Court for rejecting the
“consistent and exacting standard to test the constitutionality of a state statute that
burdens the free exercise of religion.”191 He argued that the majority had provided no
relevant basis for its determination that traditional Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence is
inapplicable to criminal statutes and generally applicable state laws, and suggested that
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the decision may have been the product of an overreaction to the drug problems of the
United States.192 Further, he argued that no government interest was pursued by Oregon
in prohibiting the use of sacramental peyote by the Native American Church. The state
never undertook any significant law enforcement activities against religious users of
peyote, and the drug was not involved in the “vast and violent traffic in illegal narcotics
that plagues this country;” the state thereby cannot have had any interest in prohibiting
sacramental peyote use for the purposes of combatting the drug trade.193
While this case certainly marks a potentially dangerous departure from free
exercise protections for minority religious practices, Smith actually fits well with Yoder
and Sherbert as far as psychedelic use is concerned. The majorities in the latter two cases
and the dissent in Smith, each of which give stirring opinions defending religious
freedom, rely heavily on the fact that the religions involved are well established, follow
certain dogmatic principles, and are made up of at least “contributive” members of
society. Concerning freedom of religious practices, the Court has repeatedly held that a
religion must adhere to familiar religious forms in order to receive free exercise
protections in cases where statutes either directly or inadvertently prohibit certain
religious practices. In light of such a narrow categorization of religious practice, Justice
Brennan’s guarantee of the courts assuming a neutral position on divergent religious
practices (Sherbert) rings hollow. Even the most radical defense of religious practices,
Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Smith, leans on the assertion that the Native American
Church “generally advocates self-reliance, familial responsibility, and abstinence from
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alcohol,”194 showing that a certain religion must adhere to Western cultural norms in
order to invoke the First Amendment.
Overall, it appears that attempting to find a niche in prohibitory drug laws—
whether through arguments for therapeutic use or on religious grounds—is an ineffective
strategy for bringing about the reconsideration of psychedelic drugs. For this reason,
Charlotte Walsh argues that considerations of psychedelic freedoms ought to eliminate
the government from the conversation altogether:
Whether or not it is believed that people should have to justify their psychedelic
use on any grounds is bound up with one’s view of the proper relationship
between the individual and the State, with whether or not it is believed that the
latter has any business concerning itself with which substances the former choose
to ingest.195
She finds the idea of cognitive liberty, or “the fact that individuals should have the right
to autonomous self-determination over their own brain chemistry,” a more effective tool
for reclassifying psychedelics than their therapeutic or spiritual properties.196 Marc
Jonathan Blitz echoes this argument, declaring that the constitutional right to “freedom of
mind” requires government officials to refrain from regulating an individual’s ability to
modify her own thought processes biologically.197
Likewise, simply because an action is considered deviant by mainstream society
(e.g. ingesting psychedelic drugs), it is not precluded from constitutional protections such
as Blitz’s freedom of mind. Indeed, Chief Justice Burger supports this very argument in
Yoder, despite his reliance on traditional notions of religion: “A way of life that is odd or
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even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned
because it is different.”198 Similarly, Walsh argues that legal moralism has no basis in a
liberal society—individuals are at liberty to make choices that may be contrary to what
the moral majority has deemed acceptable.199 In contrast, Justice Scalia takes a far more
limited view of human rights in Smith, arguing in typical slippery-slope fashion that a
different ruling would “open the prospect of constitutionally required exemptions from
civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind,” such as compulsory military service,
manslaughter laws, and animal cruelty laws, and that a morally totalitarian government is
preferable to “a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself.”200 However, such a
system is the very basis of individual liberty; its existence is woven into the fabric of a
democratic society. The idea of bodily autonomy predates the existence of the United
States and was essential for the first assertions of individual rights during the
Enlightenment.201
The idea that cognitive liberty is implied in the Constitution, and that it would
permit citizens to alter their consciousness in any manner they chose is a potential silver
bullet for drug policy reform. Unfortunately, the Court has yet to consider a fundamental
“freedom of consciousness” inherent in the Constitution. Instead, it has abdicated its
responsibility to protect the rights of citizens by delegating significant judicial powers to
federal agencies and by abandoning its commitment to the protection of spiritual
practices. These decisions have created a system that is nearly impossible to reform,
despite a preponderance of evidence supporting the need for change.
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CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis is not to dissuade anyone from pursuing drug policy
reform through the avenues of spiritual or cognitive freedom, administrative
reconsideration, or any unmentioned method of bringing about policy change. The
barriers to drug reform should be tested relentlessly. In fact, this project is not even
limited to psychedelic or drug reform advocacy; instead, it questions societally mandated
behavioral boundaries. It has surveyed the forces that constructed those boundaries, and it
has evaluated a number of arguments from a minority seeking change. Hopefully, the
research as presented necessitates questioning of a far broader and more significant
nature than whether or not psychedelic drugs should be rescheduled. In consideration of
all of the evidence discussed, one should find issue with the methods this society uses to
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control deviant behavior and the power it affords its government to enforce such control.
Alternatively stated, what limitations on the power of the majority are necessary to
protect the interests of the minority, and are the existing controls sufficient to prevent
majoritarian autocracy?
In the early twentieth century, the federal government announced a new plan for
minority control in the form of the 1914 Harrison Narcotics Act. Targeting African and
Chinese Americans under the guise of a tax measure, this law created a new class of
federal criminals. Prior to the Harrison Act, none of the modern problems associated with
drug use existed—juvenile addicts were unheard of, adult addicts were rarely imprisoned,
and illicit traffic was naturally nonexistent.202 After the Harrison Act, anyone who used
cocaine or opium was labeled a criminal, which “increasingly created a de facto link
between the use of such drugs and social marginality or criminality in general.”203 In this
instance, the unfounded and blatantly racist suppositions of the majority became law, and
none raised objections on the basis of wanton intent or disparate impact.
The federal government followed this trajectory with the Marijuana Tax Act in
1937 and the creation of mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses in the 1950s.
Once drug users, or users of the “wrong” drugs, became criminals, they were forever
ousted from society. The treatment of drug offenders since the passage of the 1970
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act has only exacerbated the
distinctions between a majority that rejects illicit drug use and the minority of citizens
that does not. Felony drug offenders cannot vote in most states and comprise a distinct
group of disenfranchised citizens. Because drug crimes are inextricably linked to poverty,
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and because poverty is similarly pervasive in communities of color, racial minorities have
been disproportionately impacted by the reality of drug prohibition.
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment unquestionably sought to protect a
new, vulnerable, and racially distinct group of citizens after emancipation. Though the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits state discrimination on the basis of race, state drug
laws with demonstrably racial characteristics remain in effect. In such a situation, just
how effective are the rights protections for minorities guaranteed by the Constitution?
In some instances, constitutional limits to the State’s control over individuals only
take effect when the actions of the State offend majoritarian sentiment. Such an exception
to constitutional “guarantees” has allowed a racially discriminatory system of drug
legislation to maintain the same force of law as the Amendment that explicitly prohibits
its existence. For more than a century, the will of the majority regarding the use of certain
drugs has dominated over minority rights. This minority was not only artificially
manufactured, it has been subsequently disenfranchised, imprisoned, and rejected from
employment through mechanisms such as drug tests and background checks. The users of
illicit drugs have been removed from every aspect of a society that consistently seeks to
further solidify the distinction. Is it acceptable for the State to create a subcitizenry,
preclude them that State’s political processes, and still exert control over them?
Psychedelic prohibition follows the same majoritarian structure, but with a very
different minority profile. Those most effected by psychedelic prohibition are not the
“hippies” of the 1960s or modern sacramental users of psychedelics. The war on drugs
did not target psychedelic users, as they were overwhelmingly white, middle-class young
adults. The Supreme Court’s denial of a religious exemption for sacramental peyote use
in Smith was promptly reversed by Congress through the Religious Freedom Restoration
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Act of 1993, which stands as a powerful example of the need for majoritarian action in
order to protect constitutional rights when they are violated by drug legislation. The true
victims of psychedelic prohibition are the millions suffering from untreatable mental
illnesses who could potentially benefit from psychedelic medicine. While no
constitutional rights protect their interests in seeking the best medical assistance available
to them, their plight is similar to the victims of other drug prohibition described above:
the government was influenced more by hysteria than by scientific findings to prohibit a
class of drugs potentially central to their lifestyle and bolstered the system with
safeguards all but eliminating the possibility of reform. Just as illicit drug users are
removed from the political process in a manner that reinforces the system by removing
the natural dissenters, the potential beneficiaries of psychedelic medicine are precluded
from political redress by an administrative system hostile to change.
In a society lacking adequate constitutional constraints on the will of a majority,
an empathetic population with empathetic leaders could potentially provide the only
necessary protections for minority groups. Charles A. Reich describes empathy as “the
ability to hear and understand the feelings of others, the capacity to imagine what it is
like to be poor, or black, or a mother on welfare, or a woman encountering job
discrimination.”204 A public that remains misinformed about the history of drug policy
and the minority groups harmed by it is ill-equipped to exercise the necessary empathy to
bring about change. For this reason, the narrative presented in this paper must be retold as
many times as necessary, until the myths surrounding psychedelic drugs and drug policy
in general have been dispelled. Only then can the forces of oppression discussed in this
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project disappear. Of course, drug prohibition is not the only instance in which a majority
has trampled the rights of others. Countless other narratives must be told repeatedly, until
a new majority is created—one that will reexamine the foundations of this society, and
implement adequate safeguards against moral totalitarianism.
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